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ABSTRACT
In this paper we provide an approach for deep learning that protects
against adversarial examples in image classification-type networks.
The approach relies on two mechanisms:1) a mechanism that in-
creases robustness at the expense of accuracy, and, 2) a mechanism
that improves accuracy but does not always increase robustness.
We show that an approach combining the two mechanisms can
provide protection against adversarial examples while retaining
accuracy. We formulate potential attacks on our approach and pro-
vide experimental results to demonstrate the effectiveness of our
approach.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Deep neural networks (DNN) are being increasingly adapted to
perform a wide range of tasks from navigation and personal rec-
ommendation systems for consumer use to a larger scale decision
making systems such as speech recognition and computer vision.
However, application of DNN in safety critical systems is hampered
by its vulnerability to adversarial examples, where an adversary
uses carefully crafted small amounts of perturbations to force the
DNN to make erroneous classifications in inference phase. In recent
years a growing number of researchers have focused on measuring
DNN’s robustness in terms of its resistance to adversarial exam-
ples[Bastani et al., 2016, Hendrycks and Dietterich, 2019, Weng
et al., 2018].
We are motivated by the defence proposals that have shown to
be ineffective by subsequent studies. A relatively recent defence
system is Defensive Distillation [Papernot et al., 2016d], which at
the time was shown a great success as it resisted all prior adversarial
examples. Unfortunately, Defensive Distillation was soon defeated
by the Carlini-Wagner attack [Carlini and Wagner, 2017]. In this
research, we first dissect the underlying vulnerabilities of DNN
that were exploited by Carlini-Wagner in order to defeat Defen-
sive Distillation. Then, we build our defence system by enhancing
Defensive Distillation and provably obscuring the vulnerability
exploited by Carlini-Wagner.
Our intuition for creating such a defence relies on the idea of
training an ensemble of networks and using the aggregate outputs
of the networks to decide on a final output. A similar voting mech-
anism proved successful for protecting data privacy via differential
privacy in PATE [Papernot et al., 2016a], where the training set
containing sensitive data is partitioned into disjoint sets, each is
used for training a teacher network. The mechanism of PATE relies
on partitioning and keeping the sensitive data secret to provide data
privacy. Then PATE uses a voting mechanism which serves two
purposes: 1) compiling the outputs from the partitioned sensitive
data to ensure correct output; and 2) carefully adding random noise
to the aggregate votes to ensure differential privacy. In our case,
the intent of using an ensemble is to minimize the probability of
a successful attack by increasing the amount of effort, and poten-
tially increasing the amount of perturbation to an image so the
attack becomes noticeable (i.e. fails). We provide empirical results
to demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 L-BFGS
The problem of creating an adversarial example is to perturb some
pixels on an image such that the classifier will label the perturbed
image differently from the original image’s correct label. These
adversarial examples are generally categorized as being targeted,
where the adversary carefully adds perturbations to cause the clas-
sifier to output a specific incorrect label; or untargeted, in which the
adversary’s goal is to cause the classifier to output any incorrect
label. Naturally, one can think of both types of adversarial exam-
ples as targeted with a set of target labels. In the former case there
is only one label in the target set, whereas in the latter case the
target set consists of all incorrect labels. Intuitively if one keeps
adding random perturbations to an image, eventually even the most
sophisticated classifier (including humans) will start to produce
incorrect labels. Moreover, such perturbed images likely will not
appear genuine. Thus, for an adversarial example to be considered
successful, the amount of perturbations to be made to the original
image must be minimal. Formally, we can define the problem of
finding adversarial examples as
min
x ′∈D | |x
′ − x | |
s .t . F (x ′) = t
(1)
for some classifier F (·), where t is the target label, x is the origi-
nal input image. D is the domain of all images which are usually
represented as a set of multi-dimensional vectors, where the permis-
sible values fall within a bounded range, with some distance metric
| | · | |. This definition is used in various literature up to notational
differences.
The first published attack [Szegedy et al., 2013] on neural net-
works arose by solving the above problem using a box-constrained
L-BFGS method, where D = [0, 1]m ⊆ R. In the L-BFGS example,
the above problem is first transformed from a constrained opti-
mization problem to an unconstrained optimization problem (up
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to the box constraints) using a penalty method, where the penalty
function is the loss function applied to x ′ and the target t . In other
words, for constant c > 0, the above problem becomes:
min
x ′∈D c · | |x
′ − x | | + LF (x ′, t). (2)
The loss function is appealing as the penalty function because it’s
non-negative and captures the distance between F (x ′) and t with
the same metric used in the training of the network. Moreover, the
loss function is zero exactly when the original constraint F (x ′) = t
is satisfied. Thus an optimal solution to the original problem will
also be an optimal solution to the transformed problem.
L-BFGS belongs to the class of line search methods which are
commonly used for solving optimization problems over a compact
domain. A line search method is an iterative scheme, and typically
involves repeatedly identifying a search direction and moving the
feasible point along the search direction. The scheme will converge
to a global optimum if the formulation satisfies certain conditions. In
the problem above, if the loss function is sufficiently differentiable,
then a global optimum always exists. In other words, an adversarial
example is guaranteed to exist; however the perturbation | |x ′ − x | |
is not necessarily small.
2.2 Defensive Distillation
Following the invention of the L-BFGS adversarial examples, other
methods such as [Goodfellow et al., 2014, Kurakin et al., 2016, Paper-
not et al., 2016c] soon emerged which further accentuated the pres-
ence of significant vulnerabilities in classification-type networks.
Shortly after these inventions, a technique for training classification-
type networks, known as Defensive Distillation [Papernot et al.,
2016d], was devised. Defensive Distillation employs the idea of us-
ing a teacher network to train a second network (student), in which
the soft labels (each containing a vector of probabilities rather that
a single final label) of the teacher network are used for training the
student network. Moreover, a different temperature constant at the
last layer is used in training the student than it was used in training
the teacher. The authors in [Papernot et al., 2016d] suspected the
success of Defensive Distillation could have been due to additional
hidden knowledge learned by the student from the soft labels, as
well as the higher temperature constant used in the student training,
as it softens the probabilities in the output layer and thus decreases
over-fitting.
2.3 Carlini-Wagner Attack
Defensive Distillation was soon defeated by the Carlini-Wagner
attack [Carlini and Wagner, 2017]. The success of Carlini & Wag-
ner demonstrated the important fact that the prior success of De-
fensive Distillation was indeed due to the different temperature
constants used between the teacher and student network, as well as
the assumption that attacks would be crafted based on the original
temperature (same as used for the teacher). In particular, Carlini &
Wagner highlighted a common characteristic in the prior attacks
that Defensive Distillation successfully defended against: that the
attacks depend on the the gradient of the network, either used as
a multiplicative term in the search direction or to determine the
amount of perturbations to add to specific pixels.
The softmax function is usually used for classification-type net-
works at the second last layer to normalize outputs into discrete
probabilities, i.e., for network F , we can write F := σ ◦G for softmax
function σ , where G is the composition of all previous layers. As
such, the gradient of the network contains the derivative of the
softmax function as a multiplicative term:
∂F
∂xk
=
∂F
∂z j
( ∂z
j
∂x
) = ∂σ (z
j )
∂z j
( ∂z
j
∂x
) = 1
T
z j ( ∂z
j
∂xk
), (3)
for input pixel xk , where the softmax function σ (·) at the second
last layer for the jth classification is
σ (z j ) = e
z j /T∑
i e
zi /T , (4)
and z j := [G(xk )]j is the jth component of the output from the
previous layers. In Defensive Distillation, a large temperature T is
used for the student network, but the attacks are assumed to be
crafted withT = 1 in the softmax function. The largerT reduces the
gradient byT , essentially disabling the search to advance toward an
optimal solution. Thus, it becomes clear that a tampered gradient
can impair the advance of any adversarial attacks crafted using the
gradient of the original network function. Noting this observation,
in order to remove the dependency on the gradient of the network,
Carlini & Wagner re-formulated the problem in (2). In particular,
they introduced different penalty functions which do not depend
on the original network output; instead they advertised the use
of penalty functions that depend on the output at the second last
layer (i.e. the logits). Thus, a more general formulation for finding
adversarial examples is, for penalty function L(·) not necessarily
equal to the original loss function:
min
x ′∈D c · | |x
′ − x | | + L(x ′, t). (5)
Since the softmax function applied at the last layer is monotonic,
the final output is already decided at the second last layer, thus
equivalent penalty functions to that in (2) can be created which do
not depend directly on the original output. Moreover, the logits do
not depend on the temperature constant and thus are not impacted
by larger temperature constant used in Defensive Distillation.
3 THE MODEL
3.1 Noisy Logits
Since Carlini-Wagner attacks require access to the logits in the
solution to (5), we can obscure the search for solution by adding
random noise to the logits. Note that if we add random noise directly
to the original logits, an adversary might recover the original logits
by making multiple queries and averaging the resulting noisy logits.
Instead, we apply random noise at query time to the input, then
respond to the query with the logit of the perturbed input. Also,
since the softmax function is monotonic, we must ensure the final
output is a result of the noisy logit, otherwise the genuine logit can
be recovered by applying the inverse of the softmax function to the
result at the output layer. Let z0 be an input with F (z0) its output
from the network F . Moreover, suppose F has n layers besides the
input layer and for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
zi := Fi ◦ Fi−1 ◦ · · · ◦ F1(z0), (6)
where ◦ denotes composition and
F (z0) := zn = Fn ◦ Fn−1 ◦ · · · ◦ F1(z0). (7)
Then at the output layer i , the Noisy Logit mechanism will produce
output
Fi (z′i−1) = Fi ◦ Fi−1 ◦ · · · ◦ F1(z′0), (8)
where
z′0 = z0 + д(®a) (9)
and д(®a) is a random noise function with parameter(s) ®a. Note that
by this procedure, naturally we can respond to queries at any layer
with a noisy output, thus preventing an adversary from trying to
reconstruct a genuine output at any layer (including the logits) by
making queries to the network.
3.2 Ensemble Voting
The purpose of having an ensemble of networks is two-fold: 1)
to provide resilience in the combined network when some of the
networks are under attack; 2) to improve accuracy in the combined
network over the individual networks.
If we require that each individual network must successfully
classify the input image, then assuming independence of success
probabilities across the networks, the probability of simultaneous
success across the networks is the product of the success probability
of each network, which might be less than a desirable level of
accuracy if the total number of networks is large since we are
multiplying a series of numbers less than 1. However, if we only
require success in the largest subset of the networks, then since
there are many possible permutation of subsets when the number of
networks is large, the success probability of the combined network
as an aggregate might be much better than that of each individual
network. Let S := {F 1, F 2, ..., Fm } be a collection ofm networks, let
δ (S) be the set of all partitions of S . For each partition h ∈ δ (S), let
Lh denote the largest subset in h. Then, the probability of success
by voting is: ∑
h∈δ (S )
P(Lh ), (10)
where P(Lh ) is the probability of simultaneous success in Lh . Note
that when m is large, the number of possible partitions is large
which means the success probability by voting can be high.
We note that although Carlini-Wager attacks are able to defeat a
network trained with any temperature constant, an attack crafted
for a network trained with one temperature constant might not
work on another trained with a different temperature, due to dif-
ferences in the trained parameters. Thus we propose a mechanism
where we train an ensemble of networks, each trained with a dif-
ferent temperature constant, where we respond to queries using
the aggregate outputs of the ensemble of networks.
3.3 Threat Model
Noisy Logits
We discussed that Carlini-Wagner attacks rely on accessibility and
integrity of the logits, and we proposed a mechanism that adds
perturbations to the original logits (or any other layer). Thus, this
defensive mechanism works under the assumptions that: 1) an
adversary can query the outputs at any layer of the network; 2) but
the adversary does not have complete knowledge and resources to
construct the original network offline. If the adversary has an exact
copy of the original network, then he/she could craft attacks based
on the original network with genuine logits, and would defeat this
mechanism.
Ensemble Voting
The Ensemble Voting mechanism works by providing resilience
in situations where some networks might be under attack, thus
it assumes the adversary can defeat a subset of the networks
(which implies the adversary could have full knowledge of these
networks). Therefore, complete white-box attacks are assumed in
this model.
Bounded Perturbations
We discussed in the Introduction that for sufficiently differentiable
loss functions, a solution to (5) is guaranteed to exist. However, if the
perturbations are so large that even humans will mis-classify, then
any mis-classification cannot be considered fault of the network.
Thus, we assume the goal of adversary is craft adversarial examples
with perturbations that are (reasonably) unnoticeable.
4 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section we assess the effectiveness of our approach by for-
mulating two types of potential attacks on our model. In the first
type we consider an attack crafted for a randomly chosen network
in the ensemble. Since the model architectures are so similar across
the networks, transferability is possible where networks other than
the chosen one might still incorrectly classify. In the second type
of attacks we consider superimpositions of adversarial examples to
examine whether this could further increase transferability. For a
chosen subset of the networks, each with a corresponding adver-
sarial example, one could reasonably suspect that other networks
beyond the chosen subset could incorrect classify as the super-
imposition could have captured perturbations that are commonly
effective on many other networks.
4.1 Test Setup
We conducted experiments on two datasets, MNIST [LeCun et al.,
1998] and CIFAR10 [Krizhevsky, 2009]. For the following tests, the
architecture of each network is the same as the one in Carlini &
Wagner [Carlini and Wagner, 2017], which we provide in Table 1a.
We first trained an ensemble of networks F l , each with temperature
Tl , l = 1, 2, ...,m. We used {Tl |l = 1, 2, ..., 50} = {10, 20, ..., 500}.
In all the experiments, the L2 norm is used in all places where a
norm is needed, including the L2 version of the Carlini-Wagner
attack. For the models with Noisy Logit, we employ a Laplace noise
function д(µ,b) with location µ = 0, scale b = 0.5 for MNIST and
b = 0.03 for CIFAR10. We experimented with different values for
the scale parameter, and found these values provide sufficient noise
without losing too much accuracy.
MNIST
We first partitioned the original dataset into 50 training subsets
(1100 samples each) and one validation set (5000 samples). We
trained 50 teachers individually on the partitioned subsets, each
was trained with a different temperature constant for 3000 epochs.
The average validation accuracy among the ensemble of networks
was 96.80%.
CIFAR10
In the setup for CIFAR10 we used a single training set (45000 sam-
ples) and one validation set (5000 samples). We do not use the
networks trained on partitioned datasets for testing on CIFAR10,
because we observed that a small training dataset resulted in low
accuracy for CIFAR10. We trained 50 teachers individually on the
same training set, each was trained with a different temperature
constant for 150 epochs. The average validation accuracy among
the ensemble of networks was 79.53%.
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Figure 1: MNIST: Counts of Single Networks Changed
4.2 Random Single Network Attack
In this section, we look at the possible outcomes of an adversarial
example crafted to defeat a single network, to see how it can poten-
tially transfer across the ensemble. Since an adversarial example
Layer MNIST CIFAR10
Convolution + ReLU 3 × 3 × 32 3 × 3 × 64
Convolution + ReLU 3 × 3 × 32 3 × 3 × 64
Max Pooling 2 × 2 2 × 2
Convolution + ReLU 3 × 3 × 32 3 × 3 × 64
Convolution + ReLU 3 × 3 × 32 3 × 3 × 64
Max Pooling 2 × 2 2 × 2
Fully Connected + ReLU 200 256
Fully Connected + ReLU 200 256
Softmax 10 10
(a) Model architectures
Parameter MNIST CIFAR10
Learning Rate 0.01 0.01
Decay 1.00e − 06 1.00e − 06
Momentum 0.9 0.9
Dropout 0.5 0.5
Batch Size 128 128
Partitioned Training Set Yes No
Training Set Size (Per Network) 1100 45000
Validation Set Size 5000 5000
Epochs 3000 150
Laplace Noise Scale 0.5 0.03
(b) Parameters used
Table 1: Setup for the ensemble of networks
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Figure 2: MNIST: Ensemble Aggregate Outputs Changed
crafted for one network can potentially fool a different network
[Papernot et al., 2016b], we expect transferability in our ensemble
of networks especially given that they have very similar model
architectures. Given some sample input s and target label t , for
each F l we craft an adversarial exampleA(F l , s, t) using the Carlini-
Wagner attack, and look at: 1) how each F l ′ classifiesA(F l , s, t); and
2) how the ensemble classifies the example through voting with
and without Noisy Logit.
We generate a set of 9 input samples, sk ,k = 1, ..., 9. For each
sk we craft an adversarial example A(F l , sk , tj ) on network F l , l =
1, ..., 50, for targets tj , j = 1, ..., 9, for a total of 9 × 50 × 9 = 4050
adversarial examples. We define the perturbation of an adversarial
example as its normed difference with the original input over the
norm of the original input, as follows:
p(a; s) = | |a − s | || |s | | , (11)
where a is an adversarial example on the input s . We bucket the
range of perturbations into 40 equally spaced bins, xb ,b = 1, ..., 40.
In the plots in this section, we aggregate by the perturbation bins
and represent the bins by their mid-points on the x-axis.
In Fig. 1a we have for the MNIST dataset, the average counts
of networks whose classifications change to the target of the ad-
versarial example, from some other original classification, i.e., for
bucket xb , the values yb on the y-axis are:
yb =
1
|xb |
∑
x ∈xb
|{F l : F l (a) , F l (s), F l (a) = t ,p(s,a) = x , l = 1, ..., 50}|.
(12)
In Fig. 1b the counts are on the classifications that change to
something other than the target, or:
yb =
1
|xb |
∑
x ∈xb
|{F l : F l (a) , F l (s), F l (a) , t ,p(s,a) = x , l = 1, ..., 50}|.
(13)
These counts are averaged by perturbation bin. The green and blue
curves represent the results corresponding to adversarial exam-
ples crafted on networks without and with Noisy Logit applied,
respectively.
In Fig. 2a we show the frequencies of aggregate outputs of the
ensemble which changed to the target of the adversarial example,
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Figure 3: CIFAR10: Counts of Single Networks Changed
i.e.:
yb =
1
4050
∑
x ∈xb
|{F ∗(a) : F ∗(a) , F ∗(s), F ∗(a) = t ,p(s,a) = x}|,
(14)
where F ∗(·) represents the aggregate output by voting among the
ensemble. Similarly, we have in Fig. 2b the frequencies correspond-
ing to some label other than the target:
yb =
1
4050
∑
x ∈xb
|{F ∗(a) : F ∗(a) , F ∗(s), F ∗(a) , t ,p(s,a) = x}|.
(15)
The frequencies are obtained by normalizing the total changed
outputs by the total number of adversarial examples, which is 4050
in this case.
In Fig. 5a we show the average accuracy of the ensemble by
perturbation bin. We see that when the amount of perturbation
is between 10% - 30%, applying Noisy Logit causes the ensemble
to lose accuracy since additional noise is added to the adversarial
examples. This, together with Fig. 1a - 2b seem to suggest that
applying Noisy Logit tends to decrease accuracy in the ensemble
for perturbation bins in this range. However, note that by applying
Noisy Logit the distribution of the perturbations is significantly
changed, where we see increased frequency in smaller perturba-
tions, and also occurrences of large perturbations in the range
of 40%-50% which do not occur without applying Noisy Logit. In
particular, MNIST Ensemble with Noisy Logit is able to correctly
classify more adversarial examples with small perturbations, as
well as adversarial examples with larger perturbations, as shown
in Fig. 6a.
In Fig. 3a and 3b we have the average counts of networks whose
classifications change due to the adversarial examples, as in equa-
tions 12 and 13, for the CIFAR10 dataset. In Fig. 3a we notice a
decrease in the number of networks in the ensemble whose clas-
sifications change to target when Noisy Logit is applied, and con-
sistently so across different perturbation bins. This suggests that
applying Noisy Logit reduces transferability rate for CIFAR10 net-
works. In Fig. 3b we see an increase in the counts of networks
that change classifications to others for the smallest perturbation
bins, which could be due to the general (slightly) lowered average
accuracy when Noisy Logit is applied. Beyond the smallest per-
turbation bins, there are no noticeable differences in the counts
whether Noisy Logit is applied or not.
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Figure 4: CIFAR10: Ensemble Aggregate Outputs Changed
In Fig. 4a and 4b we show the frequencies of aggregate out-
puts of the ensemble with changed classifications for the CIFAR10
dataset, as in equations 14 and 15. In Fig. 4a there appears to be no
meaningful difference in the transferability rate with respect to the
aggregate output of the ensemble. Note this is not a contradiction to
Fig. 3a above, because the counts in Fig. 3a are very small (contrary
to the case of MNIST). Since the ensemble consists of 50 networks,
an extra count or two that classify the adversarial example as the
target label will not change the aggregate output (by voting) from
the ensemble. In Fig. 4b there appears to be a shift in the perturba-
tion distribution for adversarial examples that cause the ensemble
to change aggregate output to other labels, where there are more
adversarial examples with smaller perturbations when Noisy Logit
is applied.
We show the average accuracy of the ensemble of networks for
CIFAR10 in Fig. 5b. There appears to be no significant difference in
the average accuracy of the ensemble whether or not Noisy Logit
is applied. We show the distribution of the perturbations for the
correctly classified adversarial examples in Fig. 6b. Observe the
range and frequencies of the perturbation distributions are very
similar whether or not Noisy Logit is applied.
We summarize the results in Table 2. Observe that for CIFAR10
Ensemble with Noisy Logit, nearly identical accuracy to the
original clean accuracy is achieved for adversarial examples
that target any single network in the ensemble. We calculate
accuracy as the ratio of the number of correct aggregate outputs
over the total number (4050) of test attacks. Note that since for
each sample we generate 50 × 9 adversarial examples, the clean
accuracy is effectively over 9 samples only. We also provide a more
detailed analysis based on a test sample in Appendix A, to further
demonstrate the working of Noisy Logit in reducing the success
rate of an attack on a single network.
4.3 Superimposition Attacks
In this section we consider superimposition attacks consisting of
adversarial examples targeting two or three of the networks in the
ensemble. Due to the large number of possible subsets of size two
or three, we do not consider every such combination; instead, since
the objective of crafting an adversarial example is to minimize
the perturbations while causing a network to incorrectly classify,
we consider a greedy type superimposition where adversarial
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Figure 5: Average accuracy vs. perturbation
(a) Average accuracy
Model Clean Accuracy SN Attack Accuracy
MNIST Ensemble 100.000% 88.370%
MNIST Ensemble with Noisy Logit 98.667% 79.975%
CIFAR10 Ensemble 88.889% 85.185%
CIFAR10 Ensemble with Noisy Logit 84.321% 84.691%
(b) Classifications
Model Correct Target Other
MNIST Ensemble 88.37% 3.85% 7.78%
MNIST Ensemble with Noisy Logit 79.98% 8.35% 11.68%
CIFAR10 Ensemble 85.19% 1.80% 13.01%
CIFAR10 Ensemble with Noisy Logit 84.69% 2.15% 13.06%
(c) Average perturbations
Model Correct Target Other
MNIST Ensemble 15.34% 15.52% 22.16%
MNIST Ensemble with Noisy Logit 13.58% 19.06% 22.42%
CIFAR10 Ensemble 3.59% 0.51% 4.77%
CIFAR10 Ensemble with Noisy Logit 3.67% 0.42% 4.13%
Table 2: Distributions for Single Network adversarial inputs.
(a) average clean accuracy vs. attack accuracy; (b) breakdown
of classifications; (c) average perturbations corresponding to
classifications.
examples of minimal perturbations are used. We do not look at
superimpositions of more than three adversarial examples, as we
will see that with three adversarial examples, total perturbation
can already be as high as > 50% in an attack, as shown in Table 4c.
Superimposition of Two Adversarial Examples
We generate a set of 30 input samples, for each sample and each
target we need to first craft an adversarial example for each network
F l . Then we pick the two adversarial examples with the smallest
perturbations and superimpose them to arrive at an attack for one
test. This gives a total of 30×9 = 270 tests; however, the total number
of individual adversarial examples crafted is 270 × 50 = 13500.
In Table 3a we have the average accuracy over all networks in
the ensemble, where in the left column the accuracy is on the origi-
nal images, in the right column the accuracy is on the adversarial
examples. We see that with a superimposition of only two images,
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Figure 6: Perturbation distribution of correct outputs
the average accuracy of an MNIST network reduced to 55.30% from
96.80%; whereas for a CIFAR10 network the average accuracy is
reduced from 79.53% to 71.40%, a much smaller reduction. This
again suggests that CIFAR10 networks are more robust to transfer-
ability. Observe that with Noisy Logit, the accuracy reduction is
less prominent.
(a) Average accuracy
Single Network Clean Accuracy SI2 Attack Accuracy
MNIST Network 96.8000% 55.2963%
MNIST Network with Noisy Logit 79.6296% 69.1333%
CIFAR10 Network 79.5333% 71.4000%
CIFAR10 Network with Noisy Logit 74.8889% 71.3556%
(b) Classifications
Model Correct Target Other
MNIST Ensemble 66.2963% 13.3333% 20.3704%
MNIST Ensemble with Noisy Logit 96.6667% 0.0000% 3.3333%
CIFAR10 Ensemble 87.7778% 1.1111% 11.1111%
CIFAR10 Ensemble with Noisy Logit 84.0741% 1.4815% 14.4444%
(c) Average perturbations
Model Correct Target Other
MNIST Ensemble 14.6285% 25.7126% 24.3226%
MNIST Ensemble with Noisy Logit 6.4906% 0.0000% 24.3824%
CIFAR10 Ensemble 2.7488% 0.0002% 3.9650%
CIFAR10 Ensemble with Noisy Logit 2.6369% 0.0002% 2.7721%
Table 3: Distributions for Superimposition (2×) of adversar-
ial inputs. (a) average single network clean accuracy vs. at-
tack accuracy; (b) breakdown of classifications; (c) average
perturbations corresponding to classifications.
In Table 3b, we have the accuracies of applying Ensemble Voting
with and without Noisy Logit. In MNIST Ensemble without Noisy
Logit, we obtained a 66.3% accuracy for correctly classifying the
adversarial images, 13.3% success rate in the targeted attacks, and
in the remaining 20.37% of the tests the combined network clas-
sified the adversarial images as something other than the correct
or targeted labels. In MNIST Ensemble with Noisy Logit, accuracy
is vastly improved to 96.67%, nearly identical to the average sin-
gle network accuracy on clean inputs. Moreover, observe that the
average accuracy for single MNIST networks with Noisy Logit is
only 69.13% when applied on superimposition adversarial inputs,
but as an ensemble of networks we achieve a much better accuracy
rate. We make similar observations for CIFAR10, except that it’s less
prone to transferability, and suffers smaller accuracy reduction with
or without Noisy Logit when applied on superimposition adversar-
ial inputs. Also, the CIFAR10 ensemble achieves better accuracy
on adversarial inputs than the average single CIFAR10 network
accuracy on clean inputs.
We provide the distribution of perturbations corresponding
to Table 3b in Table 3c. The average perturbation for MNIST
Ensemble with Noisy Logit for correctly classified adversarial
examples is smaller than that without Noisy Logit, observe this
is consistent with what we saw in Fig. 6a, where applying noise
shifts the distribution of perturbations in the adversarial examples.
Superimposition of Three Adversarial Examples
We generate a set of 10 input samples, then we craft an adversar-
ial example similar to what was done for superimposition of two
adversarial examples, except we use three in this case. We have
a total of 10 × 9 = 90 tests, where the total number of individual
adversarial examples crafted is 90 × 50 = 4500. Since this is the
strongest attack considered in this work, we also provide testing
results for this attack when the adversarial examples are crafted
using the L∞ norm in Appendix B.
In Table 4a we have the average accuracy over all networks in the
ensemble. Observe with superimposition of 3 adversarial examples,
the average single MNIST network accuracy is reduced drastically
from 95.6% to 24.69%. When the individual networks have such
low accuracy, the benefit of having an ensemble is minimal as we
see in the first row in Table 4b. However, with Noisy Logit, MNIST
Ensemble is able to achieve a very large improvement in accuracy,
from the 26.67% without Noisy Logit to 90.00% with Noisy Logit.
Moreover, in the 2.22% of successful attacks on MNIST Ensemble
with Noisy Logit, the average perturbation was > 50%. We remark
that the models on CIFAR10 are again impacted to a much smaller
degree in terms of accuracy loss.
We provide sample images of the superimposed adversarial ex-
amples in Appendix C.
5 DISCUSSION
The goals of our work might appear somewhat contradictory. On
one-hand, we are providing a mechanism that protects against
adversarial examples, and it relies on the ground that transferability
properties of adversarial examples between networks are not
completely known. On the other hand, we’ve shown how easy
it is to craft an adversarial example using superimposition, that
would result in an example that can fool not only the original
networks from which the example was crafted, but can potentially
fool other networks as well (that is, in the absence of a protection
mechanism). We believe the key to finding an adversarial example
that will truly resist all protection mechanisms, including our
work here, is to understand the transferability properties of such
examples across different networks. Based on our testing results,
it appears transferability depends very much on the complexity
of the classification task. The images in the CIFAR10 dataset
have many more features than those in the MNIST dataset, while
(a) Average accuracy
Single Network Clean Accuracy SI3 Attack Accuracy
MNIST Network 95.6000% 24.6889%
MNIST Network with Noisy Logit 74.6222% 55.9333%
CIFAR10 Network 83.0000% 68.6222%
CIFAR10 Network with Noisy Logit 78.6222% 73.0667%
(b) Classifications
Model Correct Target Other
MNIST Ensemble 26.6667% 57.7778% 15.5556%
MNIST Ensemble with Noisy Logit 90.0000% 2.2222% 7.7778%
CIFAR10 Ensemble 86.6667% 1.1111% 12.2222%
CIFAR10 Ensemble with Noisy Logit 87.7778% 2.2222% 10.0000%
(c) Average perturbations
Model Correct Target Other
MNIST Ensemble 13.0187% 29.0136% 34.7022%
MNIST Ensemble with Noisy Logit 8.3600% 50.5385% 26.6385%
CIFAR10 Ensemble 3.5315% 0.0003% 5.1646%
CIFAR10 Ensemble with Noisy Logit 3.4029% 0.0003% 3.9467%
Table 4: Distributions for Superimposition (3×) of adversar-
ial inputs. (a) average single network clean accuracy vs. at-
tack accuracy; (b) breakdown of classifications; (c) average
perturbations corresponding to classifications.
the CIFAR10 and MNIST networks were trained with similar
model architectures, the MNIST networks are much more prone
to transferability than the CIFAR10 networks. Also, we note
that it takes a much smaller amount of perturbations to craft an
adversarial example on a single CIFAR10 network than it does for
an MNIST network, which could mean that on a CIFAR10 image
there is a small subset of pixels which are most important to the
model. When this small subset of pixels varies across different
models, then it becomes very unlikely that an adversarial example
crafted with one model would succeed on a different model; unless
there is some model-independent small subset of pixels which are
universally important to every model.
Threat Analysis
We note that most adversarial examples failed because they relied
on integrity of the outputs at a layer (in this paper we focused on
the logits due to nature of the Carlini-Wagner attacks). Therefore,
in the presence of the noisy logit mechanism, an adversary might
try to circumvent this obstacle by trying to infer the genuine out-
puts from the noisy outputs. Note that since the neural network
is not necessarily a continuous function, an average of the noisy
outputs, which are function values of a random distribution, is not
necessarily equal to the genuine output of the average of perturbed
inputs. However, we remark that it is valuable to perform detailed
testing on how well an average of the outputs can function as ap-
proximation to the genuine output, though we also remark that
attacks of this sort would require much more effort as the adversary
might need to collect a large number of outputs based on the same
input for each iteration required in crafting an attack.
We note that transferability of neural networks was studied by
Papernot et al. [Papernot et al., 2016b], where it was shown in
the experiments that transferability from one neural network to
another was as high as 38% using the Fast Gradient Sign method
[Goodfellow et al., 2014]. In [Papernot et al., 2016b], they did not
consider an explicit algorithm for attacking an ensemble model.
In our testing results in Tables 3a and 3b, we showed that using a
simple superimposition of two adversarial examples, the average
accuracy on the MNIST networks was reduced from 96.80% to
55.30%, with ensemble accuracy of 66.30%. When three adversarial
examples were used, the average accuracy was reduced from 95.60%
to 24.69%, with ensemble accuracy of 26.67%, as shown in Tables
4a and 4b. Note that transferability rate is also dependent on the
classification task, where we saw in the same tables that the same
experiments performed on the CIFAR10 dataset showed a much
lower transferability rate on similar superimposition attacks.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper we introduced an approach to protect image clas-
sification networks from adversarial examples. The approach is
composed of two mechanisms - Noisy Logit and Ensemble Voting,
which were evaluated in Section 4. We saw that Ensemble Voting
improves accuracy over the base model, while Noisy Logit reduces
transferability across different networks in classifying adversarial
examples. Moreover, the approach combining the two mechanisms
was shown to have comparable accuracy in classifying adversarial
examples as in classifying genuine inputs, when superimposition
attacks were considered for both MNIST and CIFAR10. Using Noisy
Logit impedes the adversary’s ability to accurately solve the opti-
mization problem for crafting adversarial examples, as solving the
problem requires access to outputs at some layers which have been
tampered by the Noisy Logit mechanism. Ensemble Voting works
on white-box attacks and is a mechanism that provides resilience
as well as improves accuracy. Since using Noisy Logit reduces ac-
curacy in general, the addition of Ensemble Voting complements
the approach by improving the reduced accuracy.
There are a number of future directions to extend the current
work. First, we can consider Ensemble Voting using a collection of
networks with very different architectures (rather than the ones
considered here which are the same up to the temperature constant).
In this work, we determined the amount of noise to be added by
experimenting with different values. One can also study the relation
of the number of networks to be used with the amount of noise to
be added to the inputs. It’d be interesting to research to perform
similar experiments on another dataset as well, since MNIST and
CIFAR10 exhibit different transferability properties.
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APPENDIX
A A Second Look at Noisy Logit
The results for the Random Single Network Attack in Section 4.2
provided some insights into how Noisy Logit works to reduce trans-
ferability across different neural networks. However, in the case of
the MNIST dataset, we observed that although Noisy Logit changes
the distribution of perturbations in the adversarial examples, it
appears there is no benefit to using Noisy Logit as Ensemble Voting
alone provides better accuracy rates. In this section, we look at
the output of each individual network in isolation when it’s being
targeted, to see whether applying Noisy Logit improves robustness
in a single network. In Fig. 7 we craft adversarial examples corre-
sponding to a single sample and single target, on each of the 50
networks in the ensemble.
(a) MNIST
7 7 7 5 0
7 0 7 0 2
7 7 7 7 7
7 0 7 0 2
7 7 3 2 2
7 7 3 7 7
2 7 7 7 3
7 7 7 2 0
3 7 5 0 7
7 2 7 0 7
(b) CIFAR10
8 8 1 8 8
8 8 1 8 8
8 8 1 8 8
8 8 8 8 1
8 1 8 8 8
8 1 1 8 8
8 8 8 8 0
8 8 8 8 1
1 1 8 8 8
1 8 8 8 8
Table 5: Classifications of the 50 networks corresponding to
Fig. 7b and Fig. 7d, respectively. In (a), the numbered classifi-
cations correspond to the digits; in (b), 8 corresponds to ship,
1 corresponds to automobile and 0 corresponds to airplane.
In Fig. 7a and Fig. 7b, the sample input is the digit 7 and target is
the digit 0. Observe that the distribution of perturbations is changed
(a) MNIST No Noisy Logit (b) MNIST With Noisy Logit
(c) CIFAR10 No Noisy Logit (d) CIFAR10 With Noisy Logit
Figure 7: Adversarial exampleswithout andwithNoisy Logit
applied
if we apply Noisy Logit, where in Fig. 7b we see more occurrences
in the tails (i.e. very small or very large perturbations). In Fig. 7a
each targeted network mis-classifies its corresponding adversarial
example as 0 (corresponding to 100% success rate of Carlini-Wagner
on a single network); whereas in Fig. 7b, only 8 of the networks
misclassify as 0, and 29 of the networks still correctly classify as 7 as
shown in Table 5a. Therefore, for an individualMNIST networkwith
Noisy Logit applied, the success rate of a targeted Carlni-Wagner
attack is low. Thus, a single MNIST network is more robust to
adversarial examples if Noisy Logit is applied, however the accuracy
rate suffers since extra noise is added.
In Fig. 7c and Fig. 7d, the sample input is the object ship and
the target is the object airplane. There is no noticeable difference
in the distribution of perturbations whether or not Noisy Logit is
applied. In Fig. 7c, again each targeted network misclassifies its
corresponding adversarial example as the target (airplane); whereas
in Fig. 7d, only 1 of the networks misclassifies as airplane, and 38
of the networks still correctly classify as ship as shown in Table 5b.
Therefore, the success rate of a targeted Carlni-Wagner attack on
a single CIFAR10 network is very low, i.e., robustness of a single
CIFAR10 network is increased in the presence of Noisy Logit. Note
also the accuracy rate only slightly suffers from extra noise added.
B Superimposition Attack using L∞ Norm
In this section we present the results from applying the Superim-
position (3×) attack with the L∞ norm to our model. In Table 6 we
observe similarly that Noisy Logit reduces the success rate of attack
on the individual networks and Ensemble Voting allows accuracy
to be further improved for both datasets.
(a) Average accuracy
Single Network Clean Accuracy SI3 Attack Accuracy
MNIST Network 95.60% 19.13%
MNIST Network with Noisy Logit 75.22% 49.07%
CIFAR10 Network 83.00% 68.53%
CIFAR10 Network with Noisy Logit 77.47% 68.22%
(b) Classifications
Model Correct Target Other
MNIST Ensemble 18.89% 64.44% 16.67%
MNIST Ensemble with Noisy Logit 76.67% 12.22% 11.11%
CIFAR10 Ensemble 85.56% 1.11% 13.33%
CIFAR10 Ensemble with Noisy Logit 87.78% 1.11% 11.11%
(c) Average perturbations
Model Correct Target Other
MNIST Ensemble 11.78% 39.37% 49.01%
MNIST Ensemble with Noisy Logit 10.08% 46.62% 28.07%
CIFAR10 Ensemble 5.42% 0.00% 8.09%
CIFAR10 Ensemble with Noisy Logit 5.41% 0.00% 4.99%
Table 6: Distributions for Superimposition (3×) of adversar-
ial inputs. (a) average single network clean accuracy vs. at-
tack accuracy; (b) breakdown of classifications; (c) average
perturbations corresponding to classifications.
C Sample Results for Superimposition Attacks
In Fig. 8a - Fig. 11d samples of resulting images with adversarial
perturbations are shown. The leftmost column displays the original
images, the middle columns display the adversarial examples with
the two or three smallest perturbations, the last column shows
the superimposition of the two or three adversarial examples. The
rows correspond to different targets being applied in the adversarial
examples. Classifications of these images are provided in Tables 7 -
10.
(a) Without Noisy Logit (2×) (b) With Noisy Logit (2×)
(c) Without Noisy Logit (3×) (d) With Noisy Logit (3×)
Figure 8: Adversarial Images using Superimposition (2× and
3×) MNIST Sample 1
Target SI (2×) SI-NL (2×) SI (3×) SI-NL (3×)
0 7 7 0 7
1 2 7 2 7
2 7 7 2 7
3 7 7 3 7
4 4 7 4 7
5 7 7 5 7
6 6 7 6 7
8 7 7 8 7
9 9 7 9 7
Table 7: Classifications of MNIST Sample 1, corresponding
to Fig. 8a, 8b, 8c, 8d, respectively.
Target SI (2×) SI-NL (2×) SI (3×) SI-NL (3×)
0 2 2 2 2
1 2 2 2 2
3 2 2 3 2
4 8 2 4 4
5 2 2 5 2
6 2 2 6 2
7 7 8 7 3
8 2 2 8 2
9 8 2 9 9
Table 8: Classifications of MNIST Sample 2, corresponding
to Fig. 9a, 9b, 9c, 9d, respectively.
Target SI (2×) SI-NL (2×) SI (3×) SI-NL (3×)
0 3 3 3 3
1 3 3 3 3
2 3 3 3 3
4 3 3 3 3
5 3 3 3 3
6 3 3 3 3
7 3 3 3 3
8 3 3 3 3
9 3 3 3 3
Table 9: Classifications of CIFAR Sample 1, corresponding to
Fig. 10a, 10b, 10c, 10d, respectively.
(a) Without Noisy Logit (2×) (b) With Noisy Logit (2×)
(c) Without Noisy Logit (3×) (d) With Noisy Logit (3×)
Figure 9: Adversarial Images using Superimposition (2× and
3×) MNIST Sample 2
(a) Without Noisy Logit (2×) (b) With Noisy Logit (2×)
(c) Without Noisy Logit (3×) (d) With Noisy Logit (3×)
Figure 10: Adversarial Images using Superimposition (2×
and 3×) CIFAR Sample 1
(a) Without Noisy Logit (2×) (b) With Noisy Logit (2×)
(c) Without Noisy Logit (3×) (d) With Noisy Logit (3×)
Figure 11: Adversarial Images using Superimposition (2×
and 3×) CIFAR Sample 2
Target SI (2×) SI-NL (2×) SI (3×) SI-NL (3×)
0 8 8 8 8
1 8 8 8 8
2 8 8 8 8
3 8 8 8 8
4 8 8 8 8
5 8 8 8 1
6 8 8 8 8
7 8 8 0 8
9 1 8 1 8
Table 10: Classifications of CIFAR Sample 2, corresponding
to Fig. 11a, 11b, 11c, 11d, respectively.
